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The writer is director of regional security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and co-editor of the recently published book ‘Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean: Geopolitical, Security and Energy Dynamics’
If ever there was a time to use superlatives about Middle Eastern affairs, it’s 2024. The series of events that began in October 2023 was nothing short of dizzying. If the important mix of tragic, spectacular and strategic episodes will take time to settle, what has already happened will undoubtedly have long-lasting consequences.
The diverse and already fragile Levantine societies are undergoing drastic historical transformations. In doing so, they are unlikely to find much outside help given local reluctance and global fatigue. The reorganization of the region is accompanied by great violence and renewed competition.
Palestinians are experiencing unprecedented suffering in Gaza at the hands of the Israeli army. Hamas’ failed bloody bet and the inability of its partners to come to the rescue is a reminder, if one were needed, that the only path to Palestinian statehood is its internationalization and negotiated outcome. A coalition for a two-state solution organized by Saudi Arabia, other Arab states and European nations has emerged as the most likely vehicle for this. The Palestinians need to be convinced that this is more than a token diplomatic dance, but they also need to show ownership of the process, something that only the long-awaited reform of the Palestinian Authority would do. However, such aspirations remain exposed to Israeli intransigence and the potential wrath of Donald Trump.
In parallel, Israeli society has gone from extreme trauma to military triumph in just over a year. This reinforced the belief that Israel can only count on its military power and that expansionism in Gaza, the occupied West Bank and now southern Syria is not only justified but also necessary. The unconditional support that Israel receives from the US and several European countries has allowed it to reject the necessity of a just peace that would ensure security for all.
But this safety-only mindset has perverse consequences. It is costly, increases reliance on the US and alienates existing and potential partners in the neighborhood, who fear Israel will widen the conflict by striking Iran’s leadership and nuclear facilities. The reputational toll of the war in Gaza is huge and legal liabilities loom. The authority of Benjamin Netanyahu and his radical acolytes appears to be secured just as internal rifts over the nature of the Israeli state grow.
For the Lebanese, the opposite dynamic is at play. The hubristic Hezbollah must reckon with the collapse of its military strategy, ideological narrative and overall credibility. Reviving its ethos of resistance is a difficult task given the need to heal deep wounds, the sudden loss of Syria and the plight of its constituency. Many Lebanese who sense an opportunity face two opposing forces: they realize they will not get more opportunities to reform their state, but they also recognize the danger of provoking a wounded Hezbollah, which could ignite internal strife.
Above all, Syrians felt freedom for the first time after decades of oppression. The rot of the Assad regime allowed for its rapid collapse, devoid of the horrific scenes of mass sectarian violence. Instead, the new Islamist administration in Damascus has shown restraint and some wisdom. Securing peace, however, will require great feats of generosity and commitment to inclusive governance despite internal and external spoilers.
At the very least, Syrians can be satisfied with the fact that they have exposed the flaws of realpolitik. It is a great irony that ten years ago most Arab and Western countries wanted the Assad regime gone, but Syrians were divided. In early December, many Arab and Western states wanted Assad to stay, but Syrians mostly united to force internal change. Now they will need foreign goodwill. To achieve Arab-Kurdish reconciliation, Turkish moderation and American diplomacy will be crucial. To appease the Alawite community, Russian mediation could help. Gulf states could help neutralize Iranian influence.
Iran is the undeniable loser in all of this. He allied himself with militias to increase his influence in fractured states and divided societies. She expected these groups to promote his interests, instead she was dragged into the wars they started. Turkey took advantage of this, outsmarting Tehran in Syria, the central geopolitical arena in the region.
Many in Western capitals will take solace in the fact that so far these historical transformations have been surprisingly contained. There is no major migration crisis, no protracted war between states, no major terrorist attack outside the area, no permanent impact on oil prices, no consequential disruption of global trade. It is complacency that paves the way for unwanted surprises.
