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The writer is the editor of the FT
European parties run through at least three different political currents, which are called the “hard” or “extreme” right. The more they evolve – some as conservatives appealing mainly to working-class and lower-middle-class audiences, some as radicals with overt authoritarian tendencies – the less they will resemble each other. Currently, in the media and political discussions, they are placed under these headings, mostly negatively. But because of the sharp differences between them, it is better to label them as the “new right”.
They have in common the opposition of the EU, which is still committed to increasing its powers, and thereby reducing theirs. They no longer commit to leaving the union, but insist that their governments will be fully sovereign.
They are vehemently opposed to mass immigration: that largely remains the policy that appeals most to the general public. Most European countries have adopted stricter rules, some of which – like Sweden and Finland – have been framed and implemented by new right-wing parties either in coalition with the center-right or offering it parliamentary support.
However, these common positions differ in practice. As of 2022, Giorgia Meloni, a new right-wing politician serving as Italy’s Prime Minister, has occasionally worked closely with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Meloni also supports Ukraine’s self-defense war against Russia and places himself firmly in the pro-NATO camp – as do the Sweden Democrats.
Marine Le Pen, a leading figure in France’s Rassemblement National, was pro-Russian, and her party accepted a loan from a Russian-controlled bank (now repaid). However, in a speech to the French parliament in March, she said that President Vladimir Putin had “triggered a war on the doorstep of the EU and a geopolitical crisis that is undoubtedly the most dramatic in the last 20 years. . . It is the heroic resistance of the Ukrainian people that will lead to the defeat of Russia.” This seemed like a sharp political turn. The RN is now the most popular party in France, and Le Pen, its likely candidate in the 2027 presidential election (although she faces a legal case that could prevent her from running), would now win.
Russia is an important player in the rise of the New Right. Many of these parties, modeled after Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, remain closer to Russia than to the US-dominated West. They are mostly based in ex-communist central Europe – but arguably the most prominent among them is Alternative for Germany, Germany’s main new right-wing party. Similar Russophile sympathies are shown by the smaller Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance, whose leader Sahra Wagenknecht combines leftist economics with a commitment to reducing the number of immigrants, current and future. She argues that the German working class is losing out in the competition for homes, medical care and social services.
From that still-changing scene, mainstreams include the new right-wing parties of Italy, France and Sweden, which claim to be fully democratic and part of the Western camp; and larger, though so far less successful, groups, many in Central Europe, that are at least rhetorically more militant against the EU, more fiercely anti-immigrant, and more deeply committed to the values of Christianity, family, and tradition.
Between them are a number of parties that are in both currents, including Hungary’s Fidesz, Spain’s Vox, Portugal’s Chega and most importantly the AfD. Thuringian AfD leader Björn Höcke tends to play with Nazi themes, chanting at rallies: “All for Germany!”, a Nazi stormtrooper slogan banned in Germany (for which he has been fined twice). The co-leaders, Tino Chrupalla and Alice Weidel, are considered relatively moderate in comparison and are trying to unify the party. Chrupalla has repeatedly pleaded with members to unite and “stop camp thinking” – even though he was prominent in the pro-Russian camp.
“Far” or “hard” right can reasonably be used for Höcke and the many thousands who follow him. Policies developed by some other party would also qualify. It is inappropriate when applied to those who profess democratic bona fides and live by them: the labeling prevents understanding the sources and reasons for their anti-establishment views. Of course, it is possible that they are engaged in a long game of protest moderation as they prepare for authoritarianism once in power. The influence and political positioning of Donald Trump, who considered all these parties comrades, will be key in this – as will their ability to govern. But so far, so anti-totalitarian.
